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This article examines of the role of European Patent Organization (EPO) in the European 
patent system. It shows how the delineation of European patent law  has been handed over by 
governments to an autonomous, quasi-judicial technocracy at the  EPO and reveals how the 
process of hollowing out economic and political factors in the grant of patents is assisted by 
the deference of national courts to the EPO and the creation of the Unified Patent Court.  It 
suggests that these developments pose a threat to democratic governance of the patent system  
in Europe because the delineation of intellectual property rights has inherent economic and 
political dimensions which are not reducible to technical legal issues of interpretation or 




In the last decade a rich body of scholarship has emerged on global constitutionalism and the 
role of courts in multi-level judicial review in democracies. 1 In Europe, two interdisciplinary 
centres have been created in Oslo and Copenhagen respectively to engage in long-term 
research projects on the origins, function and legitimacy of courts and the growing 
international judicialisation of global governance.  At the iCON 2017 international 
conference on ‘Courts, Public Power and Public Law’,  hundreds of presentations were 
devoted to the ascendency of constitutional and international courts, commercial tribunals 
and the WTO whilst  just one panel addressed the topic of intellectual property and specialist 
patent courts.2  Yet, the growth of specialist patent courts poses unique and critical challenges 
for democratic governance because of the powerful monopolies created by intellectual 
property rights. This suggests that there is a gap in the burgeoning research on judicial 
governance in liberal democracies and the scholarship on global governance of intellectual 
property rights.3  In Europe, the creation of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) has given rise to 
polarized views on the UPC’s relationship with the Court of Justice of the European Union 
                                                          
1 Notably R.  Hirschl, Towards juristocracy: the origins and consequences of the new constitutionalism 
(Harvard University Press, 2009),  S. Gill & A. Cutler. (Eds.), New constitutionalism and world order 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
2 ICON·S 2017 Conference on “Courts, Powers, Public Law”, Copenhagen, July 5-7, 2017 
3 A rare exception is K. J. Alter & L. R.   Helfer, The Law and Politics of the Andean Tribunal of Justice. 
(Oxford University Press, 2017). On the creation of specialist patent courts in the  US, see Dreyfus, R. C. 




(Court of Justice). Much of this scholarship explores the constitutional avenues for closer 
integration of the UPC with the Court of Justice whilst implicitly assuming that more judicial 
involvement at a higher level will mean more checks and controls over commercial interests 
and ultimately more democracy in the grant and enforcement of patents in Europe.4 Calls for 
greater involvement of the Court of Justice  also tend to assume that democratization of the 
European patent system will be achieved with the aid of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as a legal brake on  the rights of exclusivity and monopolies created by patents.5 None of this 
scholarship engages with the theoretical and comparative empirical studies that question the 
wisdom that   more courts and more human rights means more democracy.  This paper is 
intended to begin the process of bridging the gap between the critical scholarship on judicial 
governance in liberal democracies and the IP scholarship on governance of intellectual 
property rights in Europe. The first part sets out the social and economic significance of 
patents and the threats to democratic governance posed by the rise of juristocracies. The 
second part examines the role and structure of the European Patent Organization (EPO). It 
argues that whilst the EPO is presented as a functionalist, a-political organization, in reality, 
the EPO is the main determinant of patent policy and  patent law in Europe. The analysis 
further reveals that whilst the EPO is not an agency of the European Union,  it exercises 
similar functions to European Union agencies  but is fully insulated from control by  national 
legislatures and the European Union. The last  part examines the normative path 
dependencies resulting from the EPO’s role in the grant of European patents and its 
privileged position as first interpreter of the European Patent Convention (EPC).  It illustrates 
the  deference shown to the EPO by generalist national courts through the case study of the  
UK Supreme Court’s approach  and it argues that this deference is indicative of the 
hegemony of the  EPO whose role remains unaltered by the UPC.  
 
1 The Origins of Patent Monopolies 
Patents are economic rights which confer on patent holders the right to exclude others from 
using the patented invention for a minimum period of twenty years.6 As such, patents enable 
patent holders to control markets and exercise a powerful monopoly since they prevent 
competition from others in the use and  exploitation of the invention. This may seem 
paradoxical since patent advocates are also typically proponents of neo-liberal market 
freedoms but the tension between patent monopolies and free trade was well understood by 
economists in the nineteenth century who vigorously questioned the wisdom that patent 
monopolies would promote economic progress.7   All the same, patent protectionism 
ultimately prevailed and paved the way for  global harmonization of IP rights,  originally 
through the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property adopted 
in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works  adopted 
                                                          
4 See for instance T. Jaeger,  ‘Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit’, (2017) 48(3) IIC-
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 254-285. T. Mylly, ‘Hovering between 
intergovernmentalism and unionization: the shape of unitary patents’, 54.5 (2017) Common Market Law 
Review 1381-1425 
5 C.S. Petersen, C. S. & J.  Schovsbo, ‘Decision-Making in the Unified Patent Court: Ensuring a Balanced 
Approach’ in C. Geiger, C. Nard and X. Seuba (eds), Intellectual Property and the Judiciary (Edward Elgar, 
2018) 231-254 
6 Article 33, Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
7 F. Machlup and E. Penrose, ‘The patent controversy in the nineteenth century’, (1950) 10(1)  The Journal of 




in 1886. Both treaties were later incorporated and IP protection expanded in the Trade 
Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994) adopted in the Uruguay 
round of the GATT negotiations which led to the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). TRIPS has been described as the most important international law treaty of the 
twentieth century because it imposes an obligation on all Members of the WTO to adopt 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection under the jurisdiction of the WTO 
dispute settlement system .8  
In modern liberal economies, patents are justified as incentives on the grounds that they 
promote innovation and economic growth.9 The utilitarian rationale is that  rights of 
exclusivity act as  incentive for investors who may recoup their costs during the life of the 
patent whilst  others are stopped from imitating the invention. The ‘social-bargain’ theory of 
patents also posits that society  benefits from disclosure of the technical details of the 
invention in the patent application as these details would otherwise typically be protected by 
commercial secrecy.  Empirical evidence backing-up the theory is difficult to summon due to 
the complex causal network of economic factors contributing to the value of intangible 
property.10 But the adverse impact of patents in different sectors of the economy and on 
countries at different stages of industrial development has been extensively documented in 
numerous studies.11 In the IT sector in the US,  industry leaders and economists have warned 
Congress that patents are stifling innovation instead of promoting it.12  In the health sector, 
the main beneficiaries of patents have been  transnational pharmaceutical corporations in 
economically advanced Western countries.13 At the height of the AID crisis in Africa, when 
eight million lives were at stake, thirty nine pharmaceutical corporations invoked the 
obligations imposed by TRIPS on WTO Members to file a suit against the Mandela 
government to prevent import of generic, essential,  life-saving medicines.14 Two decades 
later, a UN High Level panel has reported that patent monopolies are continuing to prevent 
access to essential medicines in developing countries.15 Meanwhile,  the European Union’s IP 
policy in its Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with developing countries mirrors the US policy 
                                                          
8 The tension between IP protectionism and free market competition is discussed by J. Reichman ‘From free 
riders to fair followers: global competition under the TRIPS agreement’, (1996) 29  NYUJ int'l L. & pol. 11. 
Reichman argues that IP protectionism stands against the public interest in free competition and  enjoins 
developing countries to counteract the adverse social and economic impact of TRIPS through the adoption of 
pro-competitive policies.  
9 See for instance D. Guellec and B.V.P de La Potterie, The economics of the European patent system: IP policy 
for innovation and competition  (Oxford University Press, 2007) and T. Daiko, H. Dernis, M. Dosso, P. Gkotsis, 
M. Squicciarini, A. Vezzani,  World Corporate Top R&D Investors: Industrial Property Strategies in the 
Digital Economy, A JRC and OECD common report (Publications Office of the European Union, 2017) using 
patent data as proxy for innovation. 
10 See S. Scotchmer, (1991) 5.1‘Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the patent law’ 
Journal of economic perspectives 29-41 and World Intellectual Property Report, Intangible Capital in Global 
Value Chains (WIPO, 2017) 
11  J.E. Stiglitz,  Intellectual property rights, the pool of knowledge, and innovation  (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2014) and K.E.  Maskus, Intellectual property rights in the global econom ( Peterson 
Institute, 2000) 
12 J. Bessen and M.J. Meurer ,  Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovators at risk. 
(Princeton University Press, 2008) 
13 United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report  (2016) 
14 Medecins Sans Frontieres,  39 Drug Companies vs South Africa: People die for lack of affordable drugs as 
inhumane industry ignores reality,  Press Release, 5th March 2001  




in bi-lateral and multi-lateral FTAs, used as a vehicle to impose  higher standards of 
intellectual property protection than  those required by TRIPS (known as TRIPS-plus) to the 
benefit of private corporations and  detriment of vulnerable populations.16  In what critics 
have described as a form of neo-colonialism, the EU has been using its economically 
dominant position in FTAs to require Colombia and other developing countries to offer 
TRIPS-plus protection in the form of eight additional years of IP protection to drug 
manufacturers and an obligation to prevent access to clinical trial data for five years after the 
patent term has expired, thus delaying the entry of generics and increasing their cost.17 
Internally, the European Union’s harmonization of intellectual property rights has also 
exceeded the minimum international standards of IP protection. For instance the European 
Union, in line the US, opted to increase the term of protection for copyright and related rights 
from 50 years after the life of the author to 70 years  (Article 1(1) of  Directive 93/98). 
Similarly, the controversial Directive  on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
(Directive 98/44) extended patent protection to isolated genes and cells in line with the policy 
of the US patent office at the time. It bears noting that the policy of the US patent office was 
invalidated by the US Supreme Court thirty years later in a landmark case on the patenting of  
breast cancer genes.18 Outside pharmaceuticals, the main concern has been the extension of  
patent protection in  Article 27 TRIPS to “all fields of technology”,  thus including software, 
digital information and  communication technologies.19 In the European Union, intellectual 
property rights were  extended to upstream data in the EU Directive on Legal Protection of 
Databases (96/9). Together with the practice of leading patent offices in industrialised 
countries around the world to lower the bar for the grant of patents, global harmonisation of 
intellectual property rights in the last three decades is rapidly leading to the appropriation of  
all fields of knowledge by IP holders. As noted by Heller, Boyle, Drahos, Correa,  
Reichmann, Mascus, Stiglitz, Plomer and others,   the extension of intellectual property rights 
to the knowledge economy  has erected barriers to the diffusion of knowledge,  resulted in a 
closure of the scientific commons and created obstacles to the realization of fundamental 
human rights.20  For this reason, patents in fundamental fields of science and technology have 
been conceptualized as a tax on knowledge as a public good and a power grab on the global 
governance of knowledge. The balance between the interests of investors and innovators, 
                                                          
16 H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping and J. Drexl, (Eds.)., TRIPS Plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market 
Principles (Springer, 2016). X. Seuba, (2013) 16(5-6) ‘Intellectual Property in Preferential Trade Agreements: 
What Treaties, What Content?’ The Journal of World Intellectual Property 240-261. B.A.M. Araujo The EU 
Deep Trade Agenda (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
17 D. Acquah, ‘Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data Outside the EU–Is There 
a Need to Rebalance?’ (2014) 43(3)  IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
256-286  
18 AMP v Myriad Genetics Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398 (569 U.S. 576 
(2013) 
19 For an analysis of the impact see J. H. Reichman ‘Reframing Intellectual Property Rights with Fewer 
Distortions of the Trade Paradigm’ in R. Dreyfuss,  Framing Intellectual Property Law in the 21st Century  
(CUP, 2018)  66-88 
20 J. Boyle, The public domain: Enclosing the commons of the mind (Yale University Press, 2008), P. Drahos,  
The global governance of knowledge: patent offices and their clients  (Cambridge University Press, 2010),  
M.A. Heller, ‘The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from Marx to markets’ (1998) Harvard 
law review 621-688.  K.E. Maskus and J. H. Reichman, ‘The globalization of private knowledge goods and the 
privatization of global public goods’(2004) 7(2)  Journal of International Economic Law 279-320. J.E. Stiglitz, 
‘Knowledge as a global public good’ in  I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (eds) Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, 1999)  308-326. A. Plomer,  Patents, 




between IP holders and IP users, between private corporate interests and the public is thus 
critical to the design of a fair and just patent system.  As patent laws are still predominantly 
territorial, this  balance is effected mainly through the  national laws of WTO members 
implementing TRIPS, the national patent offices granting the patents and national  courts 
where the patents are enforced. In Europe, the territorial patent model is complicated by the 
addition of the European Patent Organization (EPO) and the Unified Patent Court (UPC).  
1.1 The complex web of European Patent Law 
In Europe, in addition to filing patent applications in national patent offices, applicants may 
file an application for a European Patent at the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO was 
established under the European Patent Convention (EPC) in 1973 as the institution charged  
with the responsibility to administer the grant of European patents which, by contrast to 
national patents,  may potentially be enforced in  the territories of all the countries which are 
Contracting Members of the EPC.21  Article 1 of the  EPC states that the Treaty creates “A 
system of law, common to the Contracting States, for the grant of patents for  invention”  
(Article 1).  European patents are to be granted “ … in all fields of technology for inventions 
provided that they  are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application” (Article 52(1). Once granted, a European patent has the same legal effect and is 
subject to the same conditions as if it had been granted by a Member State (Article 2, EPC). 
European patents granted by the EPO thus stand to be ultimately enforced in national courts 
and potentially invalidated in accordance with national laws. For this reason, the European 
patent is referred to as “a bundle of patents”. Typically, upon grant, applicants designate four 
or five countries where they choose to enforce the patent and thus potentially stand to face 
infringement or invalidity proceedings in four or five national courts in Europe in accordance 
with each of these countries national laws. However, the EPC also includes a mechanism to 
challenge the validity of a patent at the EPO. The EPO is composed of several divisions and 
contains an internal appeal procedure to challenge the validity of  patents granted by the 
examining division.22 A patent granted by the EPO’s examining division may  be declared 
invalid for lack of novelty, inventive step or industrial application on appeal to the opposition 
division, Technical Board of Appeal or Enlarged Board of Appeal .23 Crucially, the  EPO 
Technical Boards of Appeal have developed an extensive body of decisions on  the 
interpretation of these three criteria, described in the EPO’s website as “case law”.   
The national courts of EPO member States are not legally bound by the “case law” of the 
EPO boards on the interpretation and application of the three patentability criteria in Article 
52.24 Nevertheless,  as will be seen in part III, since members of the EPO have agreed to the 
EPC “common” system of law, national courts are heavily guided by the EPO’s interpretation 
of these requirements and are wary of invalidating a patent granted by the EPO because of the 
risks of unsettling commercial expectations. Thus, the role of the EPO in the grant of patents 
has turned out to be of paramount importance in giving substantive legal content to the three 
general, abstract requirements of patentability which may be subsequently revisited by 
national courts in invalidity or infringement proceedings. It is  true that national courts 
formally retain authority and discretion to interpret  the EPC requirements for an invention 
                                                          
21 Article 4 EPC 
22 Chapter III, EPC 
23 The Opposition procedure is set out is Part V EPC 




post-grant. There is therefore a degree of variability in the outcome of validity and 
infringement proceedings in national courts relating to  the same patent granted by the EPO.25 
Indeed, fragmentation of patent litigation post-grant and the associated legal uncertainty and 
costs to patent holders have been  the main  reasons for the European Union’s ambition to 
create a single, central court for the enforcement of patents post-grant in the form of the UPC 
(and its unsuccessful predecessors).26  
However, as will be seen below,  the criteria of ‘novelty, inventive step and industrial 
application’ in Article 52 EPC are a hybrid mix of technical and legal components 
encompassing economic and social considerations. Consequently, the standards  applied in 
the examination of patent claims by the EPO and other patent offices  have important social 
and economic consequences. Low standards produce poor ‘quality’ patents which are costly 
to challenge and distort markets. Patents on  trivial inventions and the artificial extension of 
patent terms by pharmaceutical corporations, known as  “ever-greening”  have detrimental 
consequences on public access to medicines. Some countries have sought  to limit the 
discretion of patent offices and courts  through legislative provisions. For instance,  section 
3(d) of   India’s Patent Act, requires follow-on patent applications to show therapeutic 
efficacy.  The EPC contains no such qualification, so the  interpretation of the three 
requirements in Article 52 is left to the EPO in the first instance and to national courts in the 
event of invalidity or infringement proceedings being launched at national level . In this way, 
the structure and governance of the European patent system hedges towards empowerment of 
the EPO, an autonomous international organization with  administrative and financial 
autonomy (Article 4, EPC) formally discharging an administrative function but in reality  
assuming  a quasi–judicial function  outwith the legal controls applicable to  other 
administrative, technically oriented bodies  with similar functions in the national and 
European Union legal systems.  
 
1.2 The Emergence of a European Patent  Juristocracy 
The  hegemony of the EPO in developing the legal contours of economic patent policy in 
Europe under an administrative, technocratic mantle is facilitated by its legal insularity as an 
international organization and the deference of national courts to the decisions of the EPO 
boards. For this reason, it is  arguable that the European patent system is evolving towards a 
patent juristocracy. As Hirschl notes, juristocracies are problematic because the transfer of 
power to autonomous, professional policy making bodies is typically effected insulate policy 
preferences from democratic control.27  Whilst  the rise of judicial power in liberal 
democracies is extensively discussed  there is no comparative research interrogating the 
emergence of a patent juristocracy in Europe. Why might this be?  
                                                          
25 Graham, Stuart JH, and Nicolas Van Zeebroeck. ‘Comparing patent litigation across Europe: a first look’ 
(2014) 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655   and Cremers, Katrin, et al. ’Patent litigation in Europe’ (2017) 44.1 
European journal of law and economics 1-44 
26 See H. Ullrich, Hanns, ’Patent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into the Community or the 
Community into Europe?’ (2002) 4 European Law Journal  433-491. On the history of the creation of the EPO 
and the EU’s ambition to create a single patent court in the EU, see A. Plomer‘A unitary patent for a (Dis) 
United Europe: the long shadow of history’ (2015) 46.5 IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law  508-533. 




One possible explanation is that the literature on global constitutionalism and juristocracies is 
not directly relevant to the governance of IP rights because its focus is on the transfer of 
political questions to the (constitutional) judicial arena, primarily through the entrenchment 
of fundamental rights in national constitutions (or supranational Treaties to which national 
countries accede).  Fundamental rights are typically general and abstract in orientation 
leaving considerable discretion to courts to interpret the substantive content of the rights in 
more or less socially progressive ways. By contrast, it may be argued, the rights conferred by 
patents rest on three legal criteria whose interpretation  is dependent on the  determination of 
complex technical issues of fact leaving little room for judicial discretion.28  Patent examiners 
and patent law judges typically evaluate complex scientific data as “patent law cases can turn 
almost entirely upon an understanding of the underlying technical or scientific subject 
matter” .29  However, as will be argued  below,  the interpretation of these criteria still leaves 
discretion to patent offices and courts to determine the  appropriate legal threshold for the 
grant of a patent.  The exercise of this discretion inevitably entails policy choices based on 
political and economic assumptions and preferences which are obscured by the technical 
orientation of patentability criteria. Furthermore, it is also at least arguable that the grant of 
intellectual property rights by patent offices and courts advances the interests of economic 
and industrial actors much in the same way that judicialisation of constitutional rights 
advances the interests of political elites in democracies. The key difference, as will be seen,  
is that the judicialization of patents in Europe is facilitated by empowerment of  a quasi-
judicial, technocratic body of European patent officials (at the EPO). These officials apply a 
‘common’ body of law  (novelty, inventive step, industrial application) parading as technical 
rules  emptied of policy content with the complicit assistance of national courts deferring to 
the EPO boards, as illustrated by the approach of the UK Supreme Court discussed in part III.  
The creation of a Unified Patent Court, arguably, represents an intensification of the rise of a  
patent juristocracy in Europe driven by a quasi-judicial bureaucracy at the EPO primarily for 
the benefit of private commercial interests and industry.  
Thus, an important theme linking the scholarship on juristocracies and global 
constitutionalism with the study of patent governance, is the role of patent offices and courts 
in supporting the interests of private actors in  neo-liberal market economies. As noted by 
Max Weber “the fundamental building block of every successful capitalist market is a secure 
‘predictability interest’”.30 A key aim of political elites in neo-liberal democracies is to 
promote economic growth and encourage investment through the adoption of “predictable 
laws governing the marketplace and a legal regime that protects capital formation and ensures 
property rights.”31 These aims have been at the heart of the European project to harmonize 
the grant and enforcement of patents in Europe. They were the prompt for substantive 
harmonization of European Patent laws in the Strasbourg Convention of 1962 and the 
creation of the  centralized, autonomous organization for the grant of European patents a 
                                                          
28 de Werra, Jacques. "Specialised Intellectual Property Courts-Issues and Challenges." (2016)., Seuba, Xavier, 
Christophe Geiger, and Linhua Lu. "The Evaluation and Modernisation of the Legal Framework for the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights." (2016). 
29 S. Breyer, “The interdependence of science and law”, Judicature, July-August 1998, vol. 82, nº 1, p. 25.  
Seuba, Xavier. "Scientific Complexity and Patent Adjudication. The Technical Judges of the Unified Patent 
Court." (2017). 





decade later in 1973.32 Legal security and commercial certainty was also central to the latest 
attempt by the European Commission to revive the longstanding project of unification of the 
European patent system, this time in the form of the  Unified Patent Court whose existence is 
parasitic on the EPO.33   
 
2  The EPO as patent law-maker 
 2.1 The EPO’s functions: administrative or judicial? 
The European Patent Office (EPO) is one of the three leading patent offices in the world in 
terms of the number of applications received (34,302), after Japan (43,285) and the US 
(57,881).34 It is followed closely by China (31,031). In 2016, the number of patents granted 
by the  EPO increased by  40%, a record high in the EPO’s history.35 The leading countries of 
origin for applications to the EPO in 2016 were the US, Germany, Japan, France and 
Germany. 36  The majority of patents were granted to applicants outside Europe. Since patents 
confer significant economic rights and competitive advantages on patentees and the EPO is 
the only institution in Europe with the power to grant European patents  the EPO,  de facto 
and de jure,  exercises a dominant economic function in developing patent policy and patent 
law in Europe. Yet, tructurally, the EPO’s decision making powers on the grant of patents are 
insulated from oversight by national legislatures and judicial review by national courts and 
the Court of Justice.  The EPO defies established legal categories in national legal systems 
and boundaries in international law.  
At first sight, the EPO shares with other inter-governmental international organizations  
supposedly a-political and functionalist dimensions.37 According to classical functionalist 
theories, international organizations are created by Member States to act as their agent in the 
pursuit of a common good and for this purpose  are endowed with certain powers, privileges 
and immunities. Although functionalist theories differ in their analysis of the function of 
international organizations,  as Klabbers notes: :  
Regardless of which narrative is adhered to, functionalism plays the same role in all 
of them as a seemingly neutral, seemingly a-political and purely technical device on 
how to organize international organizations … 38 
Indeed, the ‘genius’ of functionalism lies precisely in presenting international organizations 
as a-political and serving the interests of all. The EPO’s legal structure, powers and 
                                                          
32 A. Plomer, ’A unitary patent for a (Dis) United Europe: the long shadow of history’ (2015) 46.5 IIC-
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 508-533. 
33 T. Jaeger’Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit’ (2017) 48.3 IIC-International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 254-285. D. Harhoff, Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified 
and Integrated European Patent Litigation System, Final Report to the European Commission." (2009). 
34 WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indiators   (WIPO, 2016 – Figures relate to 2015.  
35 https://www.epo.org/news-issues/press/releases/archive/2017/20170307.html  
36 EPO Annual Report (2016) https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2016.html 
 
37 J. Klabbers, ’The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International Organizations Law’ (2015)  26.1 
European Journal of International Law 9-82. See also  and J. Klabbers, ‘On Functions and Finance: Sovereign 
Debt Workouts and Equality in International Organizations Law’  in J. P. Bohoslavsky & al. (eds) (2016) Yale 
Journal of International Law-Special Online Edition on Sovereign Debt 240-260 




immunities epitomise these supposedly a-political functionalist dimensions.  Functional 
cooperation is typically represented as “merely doing things states could be doing 
themselves, but doing them better – that is, more efficiently or cheaper.” 39 Likewise, the 
EPO was created to “strengthen co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the 
protection of inventions”40 and in order to provide a more efficient and cheaper system for 
the examination and grant of patents in Europe. To this end, the EPO was created by means 
of an international treaty instead of a European Union instrument because of the political 
fragmentation of the  European Union  (EEC) States at the time.41  As reflected in Article 4 
EPC, the EPO was originally conceived as an office discharging an administrative function, 
temporarily outside the legal order of the EEC for historical reasons but to be fully integrated 
in due course. In reality,  the EU’s integration ideal has become ever more distant with the 
spectacular growth of the EPO.  
The original vision of the EPO’s administrative function is reflected in the technical  
orientation of the EPO’s field of operation (patents) and the composition and legal structure 
of the EPO boards42. The boards are hierarchically ordered. The first layer comprises the 
examining division (ED), made up entirely of technically qualified officials (e.g. engineers, 
chemists, etc..).43 From the ED, appeals may be made to the Opposition Division (OD), also 
composed of three technically qualified officials with an option to co-opt a legally qualified 
member.44 The Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) is also composed of two technically 
qualified members and includes one legally qualified official.45  Thus, as noted by Philip 
Leith, the EPC “imposes a technical majority upon all Boards of Appeal” except the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal (EBA) which has a majority of legally qualified members, but the EBA very 
rarely hears appeals on points of law.46  Despite the overwhelming technical background of 
the EPO’s board members, as  Jacob J. in Lenzig famously said  the members of the EPO 
boards “are judges in all but name …”.47  Whether  “ it is rather a pity that they were not so-
called by the Convention” is far from clear.  An empirical study carried out by Leith at the 
turn of the millennium confirms that the boards’ functions straddle the administrative/judicial 
divide.48 Leith’s interview of EPO officials reveals that whilst nominally referred to as 
‘judges’,   the culture of the  Boards of Appeal has historically been “administrative and 
examination-led.”  Nor was it clear these officials  have “ …  the requisite judicial capacity to 
properly act in that role”.49  
In particular, Leith shows how the methodology used by the Appeal Boards is basically 
documentation-drivenand the decisions made by officials with a background in (patent) 
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examination and technical skills rather than judicial skills in the administration of justice. 
Nonetheless,  Leith notes that 
“ whilst the culture of the EPO is largely a technical one this is not to say that the 
Boards of Appeal have not applied and interpreted the EPC in a manner which 
common law systems would describe as “judge-made law”.50  
He cites as a striking example the EPO boards jurisprudence allowing software patents  
contrary to a literal reading of the EPC.51 Leith notes that judicial law-making at the EPO 
may jar with the Enlarged Board of Appeals assertion in G1/97 that the EBA is not a 
legislative body.  Whilst conceding that this may be true of the EBA, Leith points out that: 
“we can see that, in effect, there has been legislating within the (Technical) Boards 
themselves...”52 
Thus the  formally technical  and administrative orientation of the EPO in reality belies a 
quasi-judicial, law-making function. It goes hand in hand with the  considerable degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by the organization in line with the basic idea of functionalism that the 
organization is acting as an agent with delegated powers to act on behalf of the contracting 
states. The decisions of the Boards of Appeal are strictly based on the EPC. Applicants whose 
applications are rejected cannot appeal to other tribunals or courts outside the EPO. A 
decision based on a procedural mistake by the EPO Boards can only be corrected by the 
Boards themselves.53 As noted by the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO in the WARF 
case54 and argued by Spain at the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case 146/13,  
there is no mechanism within the EPC  to require the organization and its boards to take into 
account, respect or apply any rules outside those contained in the EPC. The EPC’s role in the 
grant of European patents is thus structurally insulated from the national legal systems of the 
contracting members and the regional legal systems of the European Union and the Council 
of Europe.   Much like other international organizations,   the  EPO boards’ decisions are 
therefore largely immune from interference by other organizations or courts55  outside the 
formal mechanisms within the EPC through which contracting states may exercise control 
over the organization in the council, subject to majority voting and only as regards alterations 
of the EPO rules as distinct from review of specific cases heard by the Boards.  
 2.2 EPO v. national patent offices 
When compared to national patent offices, the EPO’s core functions are largely 
indistinguishable yet, unlike national patent offices, the EPO’s decisions are not subject to 
external judicial review. Much like national patent offices, technically qualified officers at the 
EPO conduct the examination of patent applications and decide whether to grant a patent or 
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not. They evaluate the factual, scientific and technical, evidence to determine whether the 
invention is novel or whether it has been previously published.  They determine whether the 
invention discloses the requisite level of technical advancement   or ‘inventive step’   to 
justify the grant of a patent and they  also decide whether the claims fulfil the  ‘industrial 
application’ requirement.  Yet, the ‘inventive step’ and ‘industrial application’ requirements 
set out in Article 52 EPC are not purely technical requirements but hybrid criteria which 
require an evaluation of the technical aspects of the claims AND the application of a legal 
threshold which must be met for the patent to be granted.  In national legal systems, the 
counterpart Article 52 EPC threefold requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial 
application are typically embedded in legislation, e.g.. in section 1(1) of the UK Patents Act. 
In the case of national applications filed with national patent offices, the requirements are 
interpreted and applied by patent offices in the first instance and subsequently subject to 
judicial review in the courts which may decide that the patent office has erred in its 
application or interpretation of the legal requirements and revoke or affirm a patent.  The 
relative functions of national patent offices and their relationship to courts are thus typically 
respectively distinguished as administrative and judicial.56  In common law systems, 
according to the classical administrative agency model, patent offices are administrative 
agencies with delegated powers under a statute to make determinations of fact, typically in a 
specialist field.  On the other hand, the jurisdiction of courts, including specialist courts, is 
directed at questions of law and may extend to de novo review of mixed questions of fact and 
law.  By contrast, the EPO boards are neither integrated in the national legal systems of 
European countries nor the European Union and therefore the standards which they apply are  
not subject to external legislative or judicial controls.  
 
 2.2 EPO v. EU Intellectual Property Agencies  
In the European Union, the  EPO boards arguably fulfil a similar function to the Boards of 
Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office, a European Union agency 
responsible for the grant of the European Union Trademark.57  Yet unlike the EUIPO,  the 
EPO Boards decisions are not subject to review by the Court of Justice because the EPO is 
not an agency of the European Union, but an autonomous intergovernmental organization.58 
The question of whether the EUIPO boards, formerly known as OHIM,  were agencies or 
courts arose in a 1999 case heard by the General Court of the European Union. The court 
acknowledged that OHIM Boards of Appeal enjoy a degree of functional independence   in 
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that their Members are not legally bound by instructions from  the agency.59 Notwithstanding, 
the court held that OHIM Boards were not judicial tribunals.60 According to the Court of 
Justice,  the Boards remain administrative bodies and not judicial bodies because:  “A 
procedure is, initially, a matter for OHIM, its Opposition Divisions first of all and, then, on 
appeal, its Boards of Appeal which, in spite of the independence enjoyed by those 
departments and their members, remain nonetheless departments of the OHIM”.61 
 
The legality of the decisions of the EU Trademark Boards is thus ultimately reviewable by 
the Court of Justice..  Admittedly, the distinction between the functions of agencies boards of 
appeal and courts is not entirely clear. Some scholars have argued that the Appeal Boards of 
EU agencies have   extensive powers of review – including full de-novo review – a power not 
generally available to the Court of Justice.  For this reason, it has been suggested, these  
Boards in reality function in a manner akin to a  judicial or quasi-judicial body which in turn  
points to the need for deeper analysis of the constitutional status of agencies. Indeed, the 
conversion of Agency Boards into specialist courts has  been underway in the EU since the 
entry into force of the Nice Treaty whose preamble alluded to the possibility of  EU 
trademark panels becoming judicial bodies.62  Needless to say, review of the EPO boards 
does not form part of the discussion since the EPO is not an agency of the EU. Compared to 
the Boards of Appeal of the EUIPO and national patent offices, the EPO is an outlier in 
Europe. It fulfils similar functions to other EU intellectual property agencies but the legality 
of its decisions is not subject to judicial control by the Court of Justice. Critically, the 
hegemony and insularity of the EPO will not be in any way diminished by the creation of the 
Unified Patent Court (UPC). On the contrary, the design of the UPC arguably intensifies the 
ascendency of a patent juristocracy in the governance of the European patent system through 
the addition of a centralized specialist patent court to which member states have ceded 
exclusive jurisdiction and which stands at arms’ length from the Court of Justice. 
 
  3 Path Dependencies:  EPO,  EU and National Courts 
 For the last fifty years, the  European Union’s ambition to create a single, central court for 
the enforcement of European patents has been frustrated by the EPO’s existence as an 
autonomous, international organization outside the European Union. After numerous 
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unsuccessful attempts dating back to the early 1960s to create an integrated court to provide a 
complete system of judicial protection on patents in the European Union, the latest initiative 
is the European Union’s  ‘patent package’. 63The ‘patent package’ consists   of a  European 
Union Patent with Unitary effect  (EUPUE), created by two EU regulations64enforced by a 
central court, the  Unified Patent Court (the UPC). The UPC is an international court created 
by an international Treaty. Notwithstanding, the UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the EU unitary patent in the first instance and aftera transitional period, the UPC will also 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the classical, EPC European patent,  currently prosecuted 
in national courts post-grant. The missing link in the EU’s ‘patent package’ is the institution 
vested with the power to grant the European Union Patent with Unitary Effect and this 
institution is the EPO.  
As noted earlier, European patents are currently granted by the EPO on inventions which 
fulfil the legal requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial application set out in the 
European Patent Convention.  If the UPC comes into being, the EU Unitary Patent (EUPUE) 
will also be granted by the EPO in exactly the same way as European patents, in accordance 
with the requirements of the EPC.65 This may seem odd, since the EU unitary patent is a legal 
object of the European Union created by an EU Regulation66 but  stands to be granted and  
administered by an organization outside the European Union in accordance with the terms of 
a Treaty (the EPC) to which the EU is not a party. Notwithstanding, the Court of Justice has 
unambiguously declared that the design of the  UPC and the deferral to the EPO for the grant 
of the EU patent are compatible with the Treaties. So, the EPO’s role will be further enlarged 
through the administration of the EUPUE once the UPC starts to function. At the time of 
writing, the UPC’s future is uncertain due to the UK’s Brexit and a pending challenge at the 
German Constitutional Court.  For the purpose of the argument in this paper, it is largely 
immaterial whether the UK remains in the UPC or not. It is also immaterial whether the UPC 
is redesigned so as to be directly under the purview of the Court of Justice as many 
commentators have suggested  would be desirable in order to avoid the dilution of the 
integrity of EU law caused by the current design.  The reasons are threefold. First, the legal 
requirements for the European Union unitary patent are left  undefined in  European Union 
law thus leaving the specification of these requirements de-facto and de jure to the EPO. 
Secondly, closer integration of the  UPC with the Court of Justice will not remedy the 
dependency of the UPC and EU on the EPO whilst the EPO remains an independent, 
autonomous organization. Thirdly, the EPO’s privileged position as the institution with the 
exclusive power to grant European patents and the EU unitary patent creates normative path 
dependencies which are very difficult for courts to resist whether they happen to be a 
specialist court like the UPC or generalist courts. These path dependencies resulting from the 
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hegemony of the EPO are further explored below through the case study of the UK Supreme 
Court deference to the EPO.  
 
 3.1 Filling the Gaps  
It is well accepted that harmonization of European Union law on patents lags behind 
harmonization of copyright and trademarks.67 Substantive harmonization of European patent 
law was mainly secured outside the European Union with the Council of Europe’s adoption 
of the Strasbourg Convention in 1962. 68  The Strasbourg Convention introduced the three 
substantive requirements for patentability: novelty, inventive step and industrial application. 
These requirements subsequently became the European and international benchmarks for the 
grant of patents in the EPC and TRIPS Agreements. As noted by Wadlow, the adoption of the 
Strasbourg Convention was  thus the  most significant step in facilitating a decade later the 
creation of a centralized administrative institution for the grant of patents in Europe in the 
form of the European Patent Organization(EPO). This was because the threefold  legal 
requirements cut across the variations in national laws to settle on a common set of  
substantive legal requirements for patentability. The threefold requirements  are thus the legal 
backbone of   the “common” system of patent law in the EPC.  These requirements, contained 
in Article 52 EPC,   were also enshrined two decades later in Article 27 of the TRIPS 
agreement However, there is no uniform definition of these requirements in the TRIPS 
agreement or how they are to be interpreted  WTO Members. Indeed, it is well accepted that 
the absence of a uniform definition is one of the ‘flexibilities’ enjoyed by WTO Members to 
implement Article 27 in their national laws to reflect  their economic and social priorities.69 
Nor are there legal definitions of these requirements in European Union law.   Instead,   the 
European Union’s harmonization of patent law has been largely limited to Directives on 
Supplementary Certificates and the EU Directive on Biotechnological Inventions (1998)  
which extends patent protection to isolated genes and cells and contains a list of moral 
exclusions which  have given rise to controversial rulings by the Court of Justice..70  The 
EPO, though not obliged to, transposed the moral exclusions in rule 28(c) EPC. 
Nowithstanding,  the autonomy of the EPO and EU legal systems was stressed by the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal in the  landmark  WARF case.71. The applicant had requested the 
EBA to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on the meaning of the specific 
moral exclusion in the Directive which the EPO had transposed in rule 28(c)EPC.72  The 
EBA refused the request on the grounds that “  the Boards of Appeal of the EPO are not 
courts or tribunals of a member state of the EU, and there is no power under the EPC for a 
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Board of Appeal to refer questions to the ECJ”.73 The EPO  thus enjoy exclusive de-jure 
discretion, authority and power to give detailed, substantive content to the legal requirements 
and exclusions  for the grant of both the existing European patent and the forthcoming 
European Union unitary patent. In so doing,  arguably, the EPO is effectively charged with 
making economic patent policy and patent law in the European Union. For these reasons, it is 
far from clear that a re-design of the UPC to bring it directly under the  purview  of the Court 
of Justice  would alter the existing hegemony of the EPO and the democratic deficit arising 
from the EU and Members States transfer of power over patents to the administrative 
machinery of the EPO.   According to Prof. Bross, a German Constitutional lawyer and 
former judge, neither would such a redesign be compatible with the German Constitution 
because of the EPO’s structure’s failure to respect the separation of powers and the rule of 
law. At a keynote lecture on 25th May 2017, Prof. Bross criticized member states for having 
created “an almost omnipotent executive with no proper checks and balances by an 
independent judiciary”. 74  
 
 
3.2  Judicial deference to the EPO:  the UK Supreme Court 
 
Whatever the shape of the future relationship of the UK with the EU and whether or not the 
UPC enters into force and the UK remains part of it, judicial cooperation and dialogue 
amongst European judges and the EPO is likely to continue to shape the legal contours of 
European patent policy in the future.  The approach of UK judges to the jurisprudence of the 
EPO boards is of particular interest for three reasons. Specialist judges in patent law are rare 
and generalist judges with specialist knowledge of patent law an even greater rarity. The 
decisions of UK judges are   particularly instructive because the UK is one of the three 
leading countries with  the highest volume of patents in Europe and  some of its highly 
respected senior judges in the UK Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) have 
developed an expertise in patent law.  The UK’s common law tradition has also stimulated 
the writing of judgements which set out in great detail the judges views on issues of principle 
regarding the EPC and its relationship with national laws.  Finally, over the last two decades, 
development of a common judicial culture and “judge-craft” 75  amongst European patent 
judges has been encouraged by the regular symposia of European Patent Judges hosted by the 
EPO.   
Notwithstanding, it could be argued that the UK’s approach to EPC decisions may be of 
limited interest as  other generalist, constitutional  courts in Europe may adopt a different 
approach from UK courts   Whilst this is true, the analysis of UK senior judges’ approach to 
the EPO ‘jurisprudence’  reveals the powerful momentum created by the combination of 
structural institutional fragmentation, the hegemony of the EPO in the grant of patents and 
the technical orientation of patent laws hedged in favour of patent holders to defer to the EPO 
to avoid destabilizing existing commercial interests and  investments. The judgments of UK 
judges evidence the dependency of generalist courts on the prior,  supposedly administrative 
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and  technically informed decisions of the EPO  and the reality of the economic and political 
considerations which are inherently involved in these decisions. Since many commentators 
have suggested that the flaws in the UPC and EU’s patent-package could be remedied if a 
revamped UPC or new specialist patent court was brought under the direct purview  of the 
Court of Justice, it is worth reflecting on the issues identified by highly respected judges of 
other generalist courts  in balancing commercial and public interests in patent policy and 
patent law. 
 
In his Burrell lecture of 2014, Lord Neuberger disclosed that, as a member of the UK 
Supreme Court delivering the leading judgment in Human Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly 
[2011] UKSC 51  ,  he had been troubled by the decision of two English courts below which 
had invalidated a patent granted by the EPO because it seemed to him that “ that there was a 
great deal of commercial and public interest policy, as opposed to legal principle” (at para. 
21). The “important policy point” identified by Lord Neuberger was whether the claims in a 
patent application showed a sufficient degree of promise to justify the grant of a  monopoly to 
an applicant. ”so that the rest of the pharmaceutical industry is being kept off, for 20 years” 
or whether it is in the public interest “that there is a free and competitive market in working 
and experimenting on those chemicals.”76 This balancing of policy factors, in the case of 
applications for European patents (and the forthcoming EU unitary patent)  is exercised in the 
first instance by patent examiners at the EPO and its boards of appeal applying and 
interpreting the requirements for an invention in the EPC.  The validity of a patent granted by 
the EPO may be revisited in invalidity or infringement proceedings in national courts (or by 
the UPC if it comes into being). All the same, the decision of the EPO boards to grant a 
patent undoubtedly creates overwhelming path dependencies particularly when the original 
decision of the EPO examining board is affirmed by the Technical Boards of Appeal of the 
EPO. The pressure points on generalist courts are evident in the jurisprudence of the UK 
Supreme Court discussed below. They arise from a combination of factors including the legal 
openness of national laws implementing the EPC, economic considerations, the cultural 
nexus connecting the higher echelons of the EPO boards with senior judges in national courts 
and the self-perceived limitation of generalist courts anxious not to be seen to make law. 
These pressures and normative path dependencies are illustrated below.  
 
When the UK acceded to the EPC in 1973, the UK Patents Act (the Act) was revised to give 
effect to the EPC. One of the most significant changes in UK law was the removal of the 
long-standing statutory definition of an invention dating back to the Statute of Monopolies 
thus effectively reducing the opportunity for judicial creativity to invalidate patents 
considered not to be ‘inventions’. 77 The reduction to the three requirements for an invention 
in the EPC, defining  the ‘common law’ of Member States has turned judicial attention 
instead to the question of whether the interpretation of these requirements by EPO boards is 
legally binding on the EPO Member States. In the UK, the answer lies in s. 130(7) of the UK 
Patents  which states that since  Member States  had resolved to adjust their laws relating to 
patents to bring them into conformity with the corresponding provisions in the EPC  the 
corresponding provisions in the UK Patents Act are  “ …  so framed as to have, as nearly as 
practicable the same effects in the UK as the corresponding provisions in the EPC…”.  In 
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short, s. 130(7) of the UK Patents Act provides interpretive guidance for UK courts, 
enjoining consistency with the EPO  but stopping short of stating that UK courts  are legally 
bound by the decisions of EPO boards. For two decades and  notwithstanding the changes to 
the UK Patents Act, English courts continued to review the validity of patents granted by the  
EPO boards by reference to their own established jurisprudence which also happened to be 
less generous to patentees than the EPO’s. All this started to change in 1996 when Lord 
Hoffmann in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Norton & Co [1996] R.P.C. 76 (HL).  
begun to  call for UK courts to align their decisions to those of EPO boards on the grounds 
that s. 130(2) imposed a duty on the UK to construe the three patentability requirements 
having regard to the decision of the EPO. 78 
Lord Hoffmann acknowledged that “These decisions are not strictly binding upon courts in 
the United Kingdom”  but he argued that “they are of great persuasive authority” because 
they are decisions of “expert courts” involved in the daily administration of patents and 
secondly because it would be undesirable if national courts were to construe these provisions 
differently from the EPO. By contrast, the court of first instance and Court of Appeal below 
had stressed their judicial responsibility and exercise of  independent judgment as colourfully 
put by L.J. Jacob in Actavis v Merck:  
“In saying our courts would and should normally follow the settled jurisprudence of 
the EPO it should be understood, of course, that they are not bound to do so. In the 
unlikely event that we are convinced that the commodore is steering the convoy 
towards the rocks we can steer our ship away.”79  
Still over a period of fifteen years after Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the UK House of 
Lords and then the UK Supreme Court went much further than taking account the decisions 
of the EPO boards. In a series of landmark rulings, the UK’s highest court overturned  the 
“much stricter” decisions of the Court of Appeal and High Court below  whilst 
acknowledging that UK courts were not legally bound by the decisions of the EPO boards. 80  
The rationale, according to Lord Hoffmann, was that whilst courts may differ on the 
interpretation of factual evidence, the EPC required uniformity on matters of ‘principle’, as 
far as possible. 81   
In 2011, the UKSC followed the same approach in Human Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly 
[2011] UKSC 51 , and overturned the decision of the courts below on the interpretation of the 
‘industrial application’ requirement prompting numerous criticisms from IP practitioners and 
law scholars alike, who described the ruling as a bridge too far.82 Article 57 EPC provides 
that   'An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be 
made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture’. The Court of Appeal  had 
suggested that the differences in the decision of the EPO Technical Board of Appeal and the 
English courts were due to procedural and evidential shortcomings. The High Court hearing 
in Eli Lilly had lasted thirteen days and involved cross-examination of the evidence in 
adversarial proceedings. By contrast the hearing at the EPO’s Technical Board of Appeal had 
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lasted  one and half-days, was largely paper based and procedurally questionable as Eli Lilly 
had been allowed by the TBA to submit a 700 pages document to TBA officials three weeks 
before the hearing without advance notice to the other party.83 In the UK Supreme Court, 
Lord Neuberger conceded that the UK adversarial system enables a more thorough evaluation 
of the evidence, albeit at a higher cost for the parties, but he rejected L.J.Jacob’s view in the 
Court of Appeal that the differences in outcome in this instance were evidential. He insisted 
that the issue at stake was one of legal  principle, regarding the meaning of ‘industrial 
application’ in Article 57 EPC.  The English courts below, Lord Neuberger said, had erred in 
setting the bar too high and (mis) applying the  principles laid down in the ‘jurisprudence’ of  
the EPO boards which had interpreted ‘industrial application’ to include ‘plausible’ or 
‘reasonably credible’ applications.84 Yet,  in reality, the so called issues of ‘principle’ turned 
out to be inextricably interwoven with policy decisions about the economic implications for 
the UK bio-industry of the UKSC departing from the standards applied by the EPO. By Lord 
Neuberger’s own admission, the submissions of the UK BioIndustry Association (BIA) to the 
UK Supreme Court changed his original inclination to affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal which had revoked the patent granted by the EPO. The UK BIA had intervened  after 
the Court of Appeal ruling, stressing the importance of consistency between UK courts and 
the EPO,  warning  of the potential risks to the hundreds of innovative companies in the UK 
bioscience sector which it represented if the patent was revoked.  In 2010, the BIA said, the  
aggregate turnover of these companies was £5.5 billion   and they had  around 36,000 
employees.85 This evidence was critical in swaying Lord Neuberger who conceded that “just 
as it would be undesirable to let someone have a monopoly over a particular biological 
molecule too early, because it risk closing down competition, so it would be wrong to set the 
hurdle for patentability too high, essentially for the reasons advanced by the BIA.”86 Lord 
Neuberger’s concluding thoughts acknowledge that where the line should be drawn between 
commercial interests and the public interest was “a matter of different opinions and debate.”87 
Similarly, Lord Walker said that he had been persuaded by Lord Neuberger, against his 
inclination, to reduce the risk of a chilling effect on the UK bioscience industry and the 
desirability of consistency with the EPO and other European Contracting States. Thus 
notwithstanding Lord Neuberger’s reservations, the UKSC  decided that a departure from 
EPO standards  would might lead to  unacceptable economic losses for the UK industry. 
Legal security and certainty and ultimately the commercial interests of a sector of UK  
industry  prevailed over the interests of other sectors, including the scientific community, 
researchers and the wider public in the grant of a monopoly over fundamental knowledge 
originating in the interpretation of the EPC by EPO boards.  
 
It may be argued that the UKSC’s approach to the jurisprudence of the EPO boards has been 
singularly deferential and weighed in favour of commercial interests. After all,  two major 
                                                          
83 Discussed by Jacob L.J. in the Court of Appeal judgment [2010] EWCA Civ 33 at paragraph 32 
84 Ibid at paragraph 96 
85 Ibid at paragraph 96  
86 Lord Neuberger 100 above. Quite where the line should be drawn in the light of commercial reality and the 
public interest can no doubt be a matter of different opinions and debate. However, in this case, apart from 
the fairly general submissions of the parties and of the BIA, we have not had any submissions on such wider 
policy considerations.” At paragraph 130 




longitudinal studies of patent litigation in European courts  show that between 20% and 50% 
of patents granted by the EPO are invalidated in  national courts.88   It could  thus  be  that 
UK senior judges  have been singularly willing to actively assist in the  political hand-over of 
power to the EPO and the priority given to protection of commercial interests. It  may also be  
thought  that the Court of Justice could offer greater resistance and follow the approach of 
other generalist  higher courts which have rejected the policies of patent offices and weighed 
the wider interest of the public against the private interests of patent holders .    For instance, 
both the Australian High Court and  the US Supreme Court invalidated patents on isolated 
genes held by the US Cie. Myriad Genetics coding for proteins indicative of Breast Cancer.89  
In so doing, the  US Supreme Court in AMP v Myriad Genetics,  overturned the thirty year 
long policy of the US patent office, holding that:  “… patent protection strikes a delicate 
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and 
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.” However, it is 
evident  from the judgments of these constitutional courts that they are aware that they are 
being called upon to  make decisions of an economic and social  nature in the interpretation 
and application of the legal criteria of patentability. In Lord Neuberger’s words, the self- 
understanding of these generalist courts is that the decisions they are called upon to 
adjudicate are constitutionally sensitive because they relate to ‘policy’ rather than ‘principle’.  
Similarly,  policy considerations  weighed in the Indian Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
ever-greening patent granted by the USPTO which  Novartis sought to validate in India for its 
cancer drug Gleevec. However, in that case, the Indian  Supreme Court was able to lean on 
the statutory limitations on the ‘inventive step’ requirement adopted by the legislature in 
section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act.90 Such statutory controls are rare in patent laws. There 
are no similar legislative controls on the ‘inventive step’ requirement in national laws in 
Europe or EU law.  Finally, whilst it is indeed possible  for constitutional courts to exercise 
some control over the policies adopted by national patent offices and the courts below,  the 
structural position of the EPO in the European patent system and its relationship to national 
courts is quite different from that of national patent offices and national courts. By  contrast 
to  the EPO,  national patent offices in Europe do not have quasi judicial appeal boards, 
interpreting the ‘common’ legal requirements of patentability and building a body of “case 
law” and ‘jurisprudence’  on the interpretation of the substantive legal requirements for the 
grant of patents. Moreover,  national patent offices and national courts stand are integrated in 
a hierarchical legal order with national constitutional courts standing at the apex. By contrast, 
the EPO is not subject to judicial review by national courts, or the forthcoming Unified Patent 
Court, itself designed to be at arms length from the Court of Justice.   
Notwithstanding the deference of the UKSC to the EPO, as well as other supreme courts in 
Europe from which the UKSC drew inspiration, it remains true that there is divergence 
amongst national courts in the interpretation of the ‘common law’ requirements in the EPC. It 
is precisely this enduring divergence which underpins the European Commission’s 
determination to eliminate  differences and enhance commercial certainty and legal security 
for investors through the creation of the Unified Patent Court. Lord Neuberger too sees the 
differences as an obstacle to commercial investment and looks to the informal dialogue 
between judges at meetings organized by the EPO in the past decades as a valuable method of 
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judicial rapprochement. Both these perspectives arguably involve an idealized understanding 
of the role of generalist courts and a narrow understanding of  patent law  detached from the 
broader social and political economy in which the patent system sits  and the interests which 
it serves.91 These socio-legal factors include the powerful pressure exercised by private 
companies at every single level in the patent system, from the enactment of legislation 92  to 
the patent friendly approach of patent offices and the EPO beholden to their clients and the  
self-imposed  limitations of senior judges on their role as law-makers in the constitution.93  
For this reason, calls to rethink  the institutional design of the Unified Patent Court as the 
ultimate gatekeeper of the European patent system should certainly be heeded.  Equally, close 
analysis of the landmark rulings of generalist courts in patent cases reveals that the decisions 
to invalidate or revoke patents rest on the courts interpretation of the  requirements for an 
‘invention’ or ‘inventing step’ or ‘industrial application’, presenting as technical, legal 
criteria  but in reality embedding public policy considerations. The UK Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to depart from the EPO Boards of Appeal interpretation of these requirements in 
the last two decades provides a vivid illustration of the magnitude of the constitutional, 
political and economic challenges arising from  the accumulated “legal” acquis at the EPO.  
This suggests that the issues presented by the fragmentation of the European patent system 
are not simply caused by  institutional fracture and its exacerbation with the addition of the 
UPC.  Critical adjustments of the substantive law on patent requirements are necessary and 
have to be effected internally – in order to  achieve a fair balance between the interests of 
inventors/investors and the public interest in the allocation of the powerful monopoly rights 
created by patents.  It cannot be taken for granted that generalist courts can readily assume 
the main burden of acting as a  corrective or as legislators on patent policy. The addition of 
human rights in the patent law toolkit94 might have a heuristic value in pointing to the ideal 
direction of travel - but the critical legal mechanics lie in the specification of patentability 
standards which in their current level of generality, technicality and lack of specificity have 
allowed   an “almost omnipotent”95 administrative body in Europe to prioritize the 
commercial interests of private actors over those of the public with the acquiescence and 
assistance of some national constitutional courts.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
 
Despite his reservations on the mix of legal principle and policy considerations in the Human 
Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly case, Lord Neuberger concluded his Burrell lecture with the 
view  that there are two main advantages to harmonization of the European patent system. 
The first is that cross border judicial cooperation is capable of bringing greater consistency 
and certainty and secondly that the creation of a body of specialist European judges with 
expertise in patents is  a welcome development “avoiding judges without patent law expertise 
                                                          
91 On the administrative reforms to the US Patent system which have led to the USPTO’s dependency on the 
fees of its clients, see: Jaffe, Adam B. "The US patent system in transition: policy innovation and the innovation 
process." Research policy 29.4-5 (2000): 531-557. 
92 According to G.F. Rich, The (US, 1952) Patent Act was written basically by patent lawyers … A good 95% 
of the members (of Congress) never knew that the legislation was under consideration, or that it had passed, let 
alone what it contained’ ‘Congressional Intent—Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952’ (1963) Southwestern 
Legal Foundation, Patent Procurement and Exploitation: Protecting Intellectual Rights 61 ( 
93 The latter is documented by Peter Drahos in his extensive empirical study of patent offices (op. cit).  
94  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights 




in the CJEU making decisions in the field of patent law”.96  On this view, patent law is 
primarily a technical field because determination of whether there is an invention or 
‘inventive step’ necessarily requires high levels of technical legal knowledge in highly 
specialized fields. 97  Judges typically lack such specialist knowledge so they are ill equipped 
to decide whether a patent should be granted and likely to differ and err.  Legal uncertainty is 
bad for business, so  the answer to the commercial imperative for legal certainty is to create 
specialist patent judges to review the grant of patents and for these judges and the generalist 
judges which act as ‘watchdogs’ to confer with each other to develop patent law. The 
argument in favour of a judicial technocracy for patents is also typically accompanied by 
scepticism as to the competence of generalist courts to intervene in the field. If patent law is 
intrinsically technical then it is – almost by definition – unsuitable for judicial review by 
generalist judges. Yet, whilst the examination of a patent application undoubtedly requires 
judges to evaluate technically complex facts and scientific evidence,  the question of whether 
the application and ‘invention’ reaches the required thresholds of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial application requirements to merit rights of exclusivity for twenty years  ultimately 
involves the application of  legal standards and principles coupled with policy considerations 
weighing the social and economic impact of granting 20 year monopolies. The applicable 
standard which decides whether the technical advance is sufficient for the grant of a patent is 
a legal standard, albeit informed by technical scientific standards.  Critically, the specification 
of the legal standard itself is not readily reducible to technical considerations or legal 
principle in  isolation from policy considerations. Underlying the policy considerations are 
political and economic assumptions about the goals of the patent system, the best means to 
facilitate investment and innovation and ultimately the fair and just distribution of property 
rights and entitlements in democratic societies. These assumptions are rarely brought to light 
in the hum-drum allocation of patents by patent offices or judicial hearings but they are 
clearly acknowledged in many of the leading cases reaching the courts.  In national legal 
systems,  ‘mixed’ legal/policy decisions typically lie at  the margins of justiciability but 
checks and balances in national constitutional contexts – in theory - allow for  judicial 
overreach  in the realm of policy to be corrected by higher courts and ultimately by 
legislatures. By contrast, notwithstanding the economic and legal centrality of the EPO, there 
are no equivalent checks and balances on the EPO and only a weak and complex nexus of 
checks on the UPC itself dependent on the EPO.  Against this background,  as argued by 
many scholars, the Court of Justice  and constitutional courts in particular  have a critical 
function to play in judicial oversight of patents granted by the EPO.  Equally, this paper has 
argued that the role of courts and the judiciary in orienting and developing patent law and 
their ideal vision of moving towards a specialist club needs to be reviewed to gain a deeper 
understanding of judicial power in advancing the relative interests of multiple actors in 
democratic societies. The UKSC’s deference to the EPO is particularly striking because of 
the resistance and hostility that Lord Hoffmann and other former members of the House of 
Lords have shown to deference to the European Court of Human Rights. This brings us back 
to the initial thoughts in this paper regarding the role of courts in liberal democracies. The 
European patent system is undergoing a profound transformation. Hitherto, the scholarship 
on the current system and its future has primarily been the preserve of (private) IP lawyers or 
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EU Constitutional lawyers exploring means to enhance institutional integration of the UPC 
into the EU and the incorporation of EU fundamental rights protection into patent law. This 
paper has suggested that the decisions on which patents should be granted critically depend 
on administrative and  judicial interpretation of the legal thresholds for an invention. The risk 
posed by the EPO, specialist patent courts and the UPC is that they are structured and operate 
on the assumption that patent thresholds are technical and detached from the public purpose 
of the patent system. The technocratic, specialist vision of patents obscures their inherent 
political and economic dimensions. For this reason, the extension of  the EPO’s  
‘technocratic’ orientation through the addition of a specialist patent court in the form of the 
UPC,  signifies the rise and entrenchment of a patent juristocracy in Europe. The literature on 
global constitutionalism and the rise of juristocracies thus provides an important 
complementary lens through which to take a fresh look at the governance of the European 
patent system. It also provides a template through which to raise new and under-explored 
research questions about the theoretical foundations of the jurisdiction of patent offices and 
courts and their role in liberal democracies. It highlights the need for  systematic empirical 
and comparative studies of these courts and an exploration of normative questions of how to 
enhance democratic governance of the patent system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
